Distributed scientific cognition within the academy and beyond

Abstract

In the article, I consider the problem of distributed scientific knowledge in two aspects: (1) from the point of view of distributed cognition as one of the ways for scientists to obtain scientific knowledge; (2) from the point of view of recruiting scientific personnel to the academy. I believe that in both the cases the problem of epistemic injustice in relation to new participants in the cognitive process remains. The concept of distributed cognition, in my opinion, is not able by itself to solve the problem of epistemic injustice and unequal access to both the results of scientific research and the status of their participants, that is, to make a transition from epistemic asymmetry to epistemic balance or parity of the parties. The most productive implication of the concept of distributed cognition is that its application to scientific practice highlights situations of epistemic injustice, each time on an ever-increasing scale. Finally, I return to the concept of science as a public good and consider some of its implications from the perspective of the classical understanding of science and the possibilities for redressing epistemic injustice.