Argumentation from a Cognitive Perspective

Abstract

This paper was motivated by reflections on what makes our argument convincing and persuasive. The substantive answer in my view suggests the examination of the cognitive grounds of argumentation. In the introductory section, I consider various approaches to identifying the cognitive component in argumentation. That way, I briefly observe recent relevant publications, which I classify into two groups: those directly addressing cognitive grounds of argumentation; and papers on formal models of argumentation that take cognitive nature of persuasion as a premise. In the second section, I argue for phenomenologicaly inspired approach to cognitive activity as one which provides an adequate cognitive interpretation of the latter. In so doing, I touch upon key some phenomenological concepts and focuses on an analogizing apperception (appresentation). The third section accumulates all the above. I proceed from the interpretation of the argumentation as discursive activity aimed at a deliberate change in an opposite party’s position, which may not be explicitly presented in the course of arguing. It makes us turn to cognitive procedure of appresentation as it was presented by Husserl for an adequate interpretation of transfer and grasping of argumentative message's meaning.