Paradigms and the Principle of Internalism: The Investigation of Rational Acceptability

Abstract

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: 1) Kuhn's teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; 2) Post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but "human" character; they are conducted around the concept of "rational acceptability"; 3) Theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, similarly, internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn's teaching; 4) The essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; 5) The revealed contradictions of Kuhn's relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn's theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the "value" aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: 1) In internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; 2) Rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; 3) The criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; 4) Rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; 5) The realistic and rational nature of the concept of "acceptability" allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always "not-paradigmatic" component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science.