Color Concepts as a Factor of Cognitive Penetration of Perception

Authors

  • Konstantin G. Frolov National Research University – Higher School of Economics
  • Andrei I. Ponomarev Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259229

Keywords:

Philosophy of perception, propositional attitudes, the contents of perception, color concepts, cognitive penetration of perception

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to analyse the influence of linguistic concepts of an agent on the qualitative aspects of her perception. We examine conceptualist and non-conceptualist approaches to the problem of what the content of perceptions is. The conceptualist approach asserts that the content of perception is similar to the content of beliefs: both types of content are assumed to be expressible in language. The non-conceptualist approach to the content of perception assumes that the content of perception cannot be conceptualized due to too much information available to the agent through visual perception. However, the assumption about non-conceptual content of perception leads to some serious difficulties with explaining the phenomenon of cognitive penetration of perception. This is an empirically established fact that some cognitive states may influence on the qualitative aspects of agent’s perception. We show that cognitive penetration of perception implies that perception and those cognitive states which affect it should have comparable content and this mechanism is based on the influence of expectations on perception.

Published

2022-10-01

How to Cite

[1]
2022. Color Concepts as a Factor of Cognitive Penetration of Perception. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 59, 2 (Oct. 2022), 136–151. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202259229.