TACIT COERCION: A REPLY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202461344Keywords:
tacit knowledge, epistemic coercion, expertise, censorship, powerAbstract
In this reply to comments by Schliesser, Kochin, Kositna, Sassower, Miller, and Eyal and Sheremet, the underlying thesis of “Epistemic Coercion” is elaborated and explained. Epistemic coercion is often thought to be impossible: no one can coerce belief. This is the thesis of epistemic voluntarism. But the techniques and responses the paper addressed were different: they were attempts to alter the epistemic environment. And this relates to the tacit. Voluntarism does not hold for the tacit, which is to say, that which is produced by experience and by prior cognitive predispositions. The experiences of the digital world are subject to manipulation, and the manipulators can themselves be coerced. In this way, a person’s tacit sense of what is normal or acceptable can be manipulated. But the same sense can be the basis of rejection of claims made in the name of expert authority. One difference between overt coercion and tacit manipulation is that the manipulation of epistemically relevant experience, through such means as algorithms governing social media content, is hidden from the recipient, and more difficult to resist. But its effects are indirect, for example, in facilitating acceptance as normal. These effects are bound up with persuasion and acceptance generally, so this kind of manipulation represents an exercise of hidden power.
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