THE IMPORTANCE OF EXAMPLES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CARL HEMPEL

Abstract

The purpose of the article is to analyze the meaning of examples in C. Hempel’s works. Hempel uses many examples referring to readings of the magnetic hand, burning of white phosphorus, predictions of properties of some elements of Mendeleev’s table, astrophysical hypotheses, terms of total solar eclipse, throwing of dice, as well as on unmarried men, on white and black swans, green mermaids, black crows, white shoes, blue roses, predictions of Jones’ recovery, the eruption of Vesuvius, the assassination of Julius Caesar, and other “special cases” and “concrete facts.” The question is raised as to whether the case studies are mere illustrative material, a form of argumentation; a way of verifying Hempel’s ideas, their “demonstrable confirmation,” and in this sense, a definite empirical basis for the study. The necessity of analyzing concrete examples in the context of Hempel’s theoretical research is shown, for which the examples turn out to be an occasion for investigating the logic of confirmation and the logic of explanation, for analyzing the structures of explanans and explanandum, for understanding the differences in inductive and deductive logical constructions, and for analyzing “quasi-induction.” The paper discusses Hempel’s famous example, the raven paradox, which is named in his honor and is a kind of logical provocation.