KRIPKE’S EVIL DEMON, CARTESIAN SEMANTICS AND EPISTEMIC SUPERVENIENCE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202461223Keywords:
local skepticism, semantic realism, rule-following, comprehensive theory of reference, epistemic supervenience, knowledge makersAbstract
In his article, Evgeny Borisov offers an original solution to Kripke’s skeptical problem of meaning. Its conceptual core is the point of view of the participant of speech acts. He believes that first-person statements of speech act participants like “I know for certain that the expression ‘e’ is used by me in the meaning of m” cannot carry any epistemic fallacies. As a criticism, I propose to point out that non-factual Cartesian semantics have serious epistemic flaws that make it vulnerable to skeptical attacks and accusations of petitio principii.
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