ИЛЛЮЗИОНИСТСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ СОЗНАНИЯ КАК РАЗВИТИЕ ТЕОРИИ ТОЖДЕСТВА МЕНТАЛЬНОГО И ФИЗИЧЕСКОГО

Авторы

  • Максим Дмитриевич Горбачев Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202461229

Ключевые слова:

философия сознания, физикализм, теория тождества, иллюзионизм, феноменальное сознание, трудная проблема сознания

Аннотация

В статье рассматривается иллюзионистская теория сознания, которая утверждает, что феноменальное сознание является иллюзией, порожденной искажением физическими процессами в мозге. Автор сравнивает эту теорию с более ранней теорией тождества ментального и физического, выявляя как сходства, так и различия между ними.

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Загрузки

Опубликован

2024-09-18

Как цитировать

[1]
2024. ИЛЛЮЗИОНИСТСКАЯ ТЕОРИЯ СОЗНАНИЯ КАК РАЗВИТИЕ ТЕОРИИ ТОЖДЕСТВА МЕНТАЛЬНОГО И ФИЗИЧЕСКОГО. Эпистемология и философия науки. 61, 2 (Sep. 2024), 114–133. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202461229.