Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail of Epistemology?

Abstract

The paper explores a variant of such contemporary theory of perception as disjunctivism. This theory is a version of direct realism. Its essence lies in the fact that perceptual states, usually attributed to one kind, are proposed to be considered as a disjunction of two types of experiences: veridical and illusory (hallucinatory). In the case of veridical perception, the content of the perceptual state is the state of affairs to which it is directed. Illusory perception has no such content. There are two versions of disjunctivism – metaphysical and epistemological. The article analyzes epistemological disjunctivism, primarily Pritchard's thesis that this theory allows resolving the dispute between internalists and externalists regarding the justification of knowledge. That is why Pritchard calls this approach the Holy Grail of epistemology. In order to accept epistemological disjunctivism as a theory that allows us to resolve this dispute, it is necessary to answer the objections of the skeptic and solve the problem of distinguishability of veridical and illusory perceptual experiences. The first part of the work analyzes the variant of epistemological disjunctivism proposed by McDowell, and notes that the quietist approach used by the philosopher, although it allows to overcome Cartesian skepticism, nevertheless, does not provide a constructive solution to the problem of distinguishability. In the second part of the article, the solution to this problem, proposed by Pritchard, is reconstructed, which consists in preserving the principle of epistemic closure, abandoning the strategy of relevant alternatives and replacing in justification of perceptual knowledge the principle of discrimination with the principle of favouring. Pritchard refers to his approach as Neo-Mooreanism. In the final part of the study, the refutation of skepticism proposed by Moore and Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moorean strategy are analyzed, and it is also pointed out that this criticism can be directed against Pritchard's solution to the problem of distinguishability.