Creativity in Science as a Social Phenomenon

Abstract

The philosophical understanding of scientific creativity cannot be limited to the analysis of cognitive abilities or ways of solving problems. It is always anthropologically-laden, based on a historically specific image of a personality who knows. The problem of creativity also articulates the well-known paradox of novelty: the new does not arise from the old, since it is significantly different from it, but it cannot arise from nothing, because then it remains incomprehensible. Paul Feyerabend criticizes such a "mysterianic" concept of scientific creativity, which emphasizes its emergence, i.e., suddenness and inexplicability. The distance between subject and object, man and nature, knowledge and reality in this case remains insurmountable. To solve this problem, it is necessary to place creativity in the space between the uniqueness of the creative personality and the mechanisms of social recognition. This, in turn, needs to rethink the ontological content of creativity, as well as the concept of "labor" by referring to Karl Marx’ rethinking of it as the production of not only material goods, but also the personality himself. Moreover, creativity does not just form a personality: it is a way of cultivating the entire social space. An unexpected move is provided by an appeal to a new social group – the precariat, which in science gives a lesson in openness to novelty and theoretical freedom. As a result, a deeper understanding of the social base of creativity arises, and a new strategy for the interaction of the scientific community with extra-paradigm groups and marginal individuals is being built.