Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem: Insights from Philosophy of Science

Authors

  • Vervoort Louis University of Tyumen
  • Shevchenko Alexander A. Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225917

Keywords:

Gettier problem, Epistemic relativism, perspectivism, philosophy of science, Zagzebski, Quine

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present a variant of epistemic relativism that is compatible with a language practice especially popular among scientists. We argue that in science, but also in philosophy, propositions are naturally ‘relativized’ to sets of hypotheses or theories, and that a similar language practice allows one to interpret canonical problems of epistemology. We apply the model to Gettier’s problem, and derive a condition under which counterexamples à la Gettier to Plato’s account of knowledge do not arise. We argue that these findings give further content to a well-known result by Zagzebski (1994). Our interpretation points to a type of epistemic relativism having links with contextualism in epistemology, and perspectivism in philosophy of science.

Downloads

Published

2022-09-01

Issue

Vol. 59 No. 1 (2022): Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

Section

Epistemology and Cognition

How to Cite

[1]
2022. Epistemic Relativism and the Gettier Problem: Insights from Philosophy of Science. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 59, 1 (Sep. 2022), 58–80. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20225917.