History of science: projects and reality

Abstract

The article analyzes the key methodological problems of modern research in the field of the history of science. It is shown that in the 18th and 19th centuries, works on the history of science demonstrated the difficult paths of scientists to the heights of scientific discoveries. The positivism of the 19th century opens the field of the philosophy of science, emphasizing the crucial role of scientific knowledge for the development of civilization. The history of science is fundamental to the demonstration of this thesis. However, in the 20th century, the history of science solved mainly applied problems. It was necessary as a cursory review of the main achievements of various scientific disciplines arranged in chronological order. In fact, the history of science was based on the cumulative concept of the development of science and was its justification. Criticism of cumulatism and the fight against anti-historical stereotypes began thanks to T. Kuhn. Later, a criticism of presentism began in the community of science historians as the main methodology for reconstructing the development of cognition. It is shown that the history of science is closely connected with the philosophy of science; however, genuine cooperation between philosophers and historians of science has not yet occurred. The situation changed with the advent of a new philosophical discipline - historical epistemology.