Wittgenstein’s Problem of Rule-Following and Legal Philosophy Studies
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5840/202057337Keywords:
rule-following, legal language, legal rule, analytical legal philosophyAbstract
The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book “The Idea of Social Science” (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.
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Published
2020-10-20
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Panel Discussion
How to Cite
[1]
2020. Wittgenstein’s Problem of Rule-Following and Legal Philosophy Studies. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 57, 3 (Oct. 2020), 34–39. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/202057337.