The Rule-Following Problem and Wittgenstein’s Place in Sociology Studies: A Return to Peter Winch

Authors

  • Kirill A. Rodin Institute of Philosophy and Law, Siberian Brunch of the Russian Academy of Sciences

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057336

Keywords:

Wittgenstein, Winch, rule-following problem, Kripke's skeptical paradox, ethnometodology, sociology of scientific knowledge

Abstract

The article presents an attempt to evaluate the influence of the late Wittgenstein philosophy (by the example of the rule-following problem) on sociology and some empirical programs of sociological research. At first we give a brief overview of the rule-following problem and consider, on the one hand, a skeptical reading and a skeptical solution to the problem by S. Kripke and, on the other hand, criticism towards Kripke by some Wittgensteinians). Then we reveal the role of skeptic reading in the sociological works of D. Bloor and the role of anti-sceptic reading in ethnomethodological projects. At the end we show the paramount importance of Peter Winch - we prove the following thesis: the ideas of Peter Winch anticipated many of the points and arguments in the dispute between D. Bloor and ethnomethodology.

Published

2020-10-20

How to Cite

[1]
2020. The Rule-Following Problem and Wittgenstein’s Place in Sociology Studies: A Return to Peter Winch. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 57, 3 (Oct. 2020), 23–33. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057336.