Gettier Problem: What Should We Do with the Puzzle of Analytical Epistemology?

Authors

  • Timofey S. Demin Saint Petersburg State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5840/eps201956349

Keywords:

epistemology, knowledge, Gettier problem, reliabilism, causal theory, contextualism, knowledge first

Abstract

Theories, that answering the question “What is knowledge?” in analytic epistemology appears under the influence of Gettier cases - a way of refutation such theories of knowledge, that have truth and belief as constituent elements. In the paper were analyzed basic strategies of solving the Gettier problem. One way is to save the analysis of knowledge by changing the elements in order to avoid the Gettier problem. There are three possible ways of doing so: adding new elements to the justification, changing the justification on the other criteria or strengthen the justification in such a way, that it would resolve any possible Gettier cases. For each strategy analysis of the theories of knowledge is given. In the paper idea of the inescapability of Gettier cases for analysis of knowledge was supported by the argumentation of Linda Zagzebski. In that ground, the analysis of knowledge was refuted. From that perspective, two of the most influenced ways of answering the question “what is knowledge” was proposed. First, the irreducible theory of knowledge, where knowledge is a mere state of the mind. Second, rejection existence of the universal invariant of the knowledge in every case. There are multiple senses of what the knowledge is and none of them is prior to other. The author lives as the open question the right way to think about the knowledge. In the closing part of the paper, the author presents a perspective critique of the knowledge problem as the project of overrated significance, and argues for a need to create new arguments that supporting that problem.

Published

2020-01-03

Issue

Section

Epistemology and Cognition

How to Cite

[1]
2020. Gettier Problem: What Should We Do with the Puzzle of Analytical Epistemology?. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 56, 3 (Jan. 2020), 58–75. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/eps201956349.