Difficulties of I-Perspective in Projects of Phenomenology and Naturalism Integration

Authors

  • Diana E. Gasparyan National Research University – Higher School of Economics

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5840/eps201956470

Keywords:

neurophenomenology, enactivism, first-person perspective, I-consciousness, I-perspective, philosophy of consciousness, subject philosophy

Abstract

The article explores the private nature of subjectivity in programs of integration the phenomenology with naturalism. It is considered if their tools are relevant for the phenomenological, rather than naturalistic way of subjectivity`s explaining. Justification of the key ideas is provided with the help of such concepts as "body image", "body scheme", (Sh. Gallagher), "ontological significance" (L. Baker), "experience", "cognitive niches" (F. Varela), "transparent body" (T. Fuchs). Based on the traditional phenomenology of E. Husserl, it is shown that a set of approaches that integrate phenomenology and naturalism within the framework of "first-person philosophy" can be characterized as a phenomenology without a phenomenological subject. It is shown that the phenomenological nature of the self-perspective in integrative programs is more likely to be understood as the qualification and privacy of subjectivity, while the transcendental aspect of the unobservable and biased consciousness is practically not taken into account. The article concludes that the logic of some projects of integration of phenomenology and naturalism overlook this transcendental peculiarity of consciousness, its fundamentally unobserved character. The classical phenomenological approach emphasizes on the extra-natural, biased, and non-empirical nature of consciousness. The role and significance of the phenomenological approach is not limited to the idea of “what-is-likeness” and privacy of subjective states. Phenomenology, which preserves the idea of the subject, means a radical break with the ontology of things and, in general, with the ontology of something objective at all.

Published

2020-01-04

How to Cite

[1]
2020. Difficulties of I-Perspective in Projects of Phenomenology and Naturalism Integration. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 56, 4 (Jan. 2020), 99–116. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/eps201956470.