MEINONG, WITTGENSTEIN AND AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY

Abstract

This article considers the problem of defining the concept of "Austrian philosophy" in the context of the possible influence of Austrian philosophy of the XIX century on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. From Haller&Neurath’s point of view the Austrian philosophical tradition can be represented as a single chain of mutual influences. In particular, we can trace continuity, find common features in the philosophy of the Brentano school and philosophy of the Vienna Circle. But here is the question. Should Ludwig Wittgenstein also be included in this tradition? By responding to this question, we can better understand the boundaries of this tradition. But in case we include Wittgenstein in this tradition, then he will be in one tradition with Alexius Meinong, who is often called Wittgenstein's opponent in logic, semantics and philosophical psychology. Therefore, our task is to find out whether these theories are really so different. May be we can find common features or signs of the influence of one theory on another. The main clue in this case is the concept of "Sachverhalt" or "state of affairs", which Wittgenstein used in "Tractatus" and which is quite comparable in meaning with the Meinong’s concept of "objektiv".