OBJECTIVITY IN THE MIRROR OF LANGUAGE: FROM LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS TO EPISTEMOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS

Abstract

The article presents a semantic analysis of linguistic practices in the use of the lexeme objective and its derivatives, based on a corpus of natural science articles. The aim of the study is to identify the semantic and pragmatic features of the lexeme, analyze the obtained results from a linguistic perspective, and interpret these results with reference to philosophical concepts of objectivity. A linguistic analysis of the contexts in which the lexemes in question are used shows that the ontological understanding of objectivity as correspondence to reality is preserved in scientific discourse, but occupies a peripheral position. The dominant understanding is methodological, in which objectivity is associated with the characteristics of methods, procedures, and measurement practices. Further analysis involved interpreting the linguistic data obtained with reference to philosophical concepts of objectivity, which made it possible to identify two aspects of the problematic nature of the concept. The first is related to the discrepancy between the understanding of objectivity expressed in the language of scientific articles and the characteristics of that language itself. This discrepancy is formulated within the framework of Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison's approach to objectivity. The use of the lexeme objective and its derivatives reflects the ideal of "mechanical objectivity", which presupposes instrumental independence, formalization, and the elimination of the subject. However, the language of scientific articles simultaneously embodies the normative ideal of "trained judgment", which includes interpretation, evaluation, and the rhetorical organization of material. This may indicate that a gradual transition between these epistemic norms is taking place, but is not recognized by the scientific community itself. The second discrepancy arises between the interpretation of objectivity recorded in the texts of scientific articles and its treatment in the philosophical literature. In the texts of scientific articles, objectivity can be interpreted in an ontological and methodological sense. In the philosophy of science, alongside these two types, an intersubjective understanding of objectivity is also distinguished, which entails interpreting objectivity as social shareability and reproducibility within a community. The third type is not reflected in linguistic practices, yet it is crucial for a number of trends in the philosophy of science, in particular for adherents of the "strong program". It is possibly this discrepancy in the understanding of objectivity that gave rise to the intensity of the "science wars" polemics. This discrepancy also raises the question of the degree of correspondence between philosophical conceptualizations of science and the actual discursive forms of scientific activity.