THE EVOLUTION OF HILARY PUTNAM’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: OR PUTNAM AGAINST PUTNAM
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202562114Keywords:
Hilary Putnam, philosophy of mind, consciousness, perception, qualia, functionalism, externalism, transactionalismAbstract
The aim of the article is to analyze Hilary Putnam’s philosophy of mind. The early and late periods of the philosopher's work are analyzed to identify the key ideas of Putnam’s philosophy of mind in each. The early period is characterized by the development of a functionalist approach to the interpretation of mental states. According to functionalism, mental states must be explained in terms of their functions. The turning point that defined the division into early and late periods of Putnam’s philosophy of mind was the philosopher’s concept of semantic externalism, according to which the content of mental states is determined by external factors. The externalist conclusions ran counter to the individualist ideas of functionalism, which is why the philosopher became one of the main critics of the movement he was at the origin of. However, it cannot be said that the rupture was final. The late period is characterized by a shift away from treating mental states as independent of the external world. Another feature of the late period is the philosopher’s focus on the problem of perception, which develops an approach called “transactionalism”. A distinctive feature of transactionalism is the attempt to reconcile phenomenalism and the idea of qualia with naïve realism. It concludes with an attempt to reflect on the paradigmatic significance of the evolution of Putnam’s ideas. It is concluded that the methodological lesson to be drawn from the analysis of Putnam’s evolution, his critical analysis and self-criticism will reveal the contradictions of contemporary philosophical discussions.
References
Васильев В.В. Трудная проблема сознания. М.: Прогресс-Традиция, 2009. 272 с.
Гусев А.А. Проблема восприятия: дизъюнктивизм vs репрезентационализм // Философский журнал. 2022. Т. 15. № 1. С. 115–130.
Джохадзе И.Д. Прагматический реализм Хилари Патнэма. М.: Канон+ РООИ «Реабилитация», 2013. 288 с.
Джохадзе И.Д. В защиту семантического экстернализма. Аргументы Хилари Патнэма // Философский журнал. 2017. Т. 10. № 1. С. 154–162.
Иванов Д.В. Экстернализм и теория расширенного сознания // Философия науки и техники. 2019. Т. 24. № 2. С. 33–42.
Лебедев М.В. “The Matrix never has you”. Хилари Патнэм и традиционная философия // Патнэм Х. Разум, истина и история / Пер. с англ. Т. Дмитриева, М. Лебедева. М.: Праксис, 2002. C. 283–294.
Макеева Л.Б. Философия Х. Патнэма. М.: ИФ РАН, 1996. 190 с.
Макеева Л.Б. Семантические идеи Х. Патнэма // История философии. 1997. № 1. С. 121–135.
Макеева Л.Б. Предисловие // Патнэм Х. Философия сознания / Пер. с англ. Л. Макеевой, О. Назаровой, А. Никифорова. М.: Дом интеллектуальной книги, 1999. С. 7–22.
Патнэм Х. Химера когнитивной науки // Философия и будущее цивилизации: Тезисы докладов и выступлений IV Российского философского конгресса (Москва, 24–28 мая 2005 г.). М., 2005. Т. 1. С. 276.
Bourget, D., Chalmers, D.J. “Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 Philpapers Survey”, Philosophers’ Imprint, 2023, vol. 23. [https:// philarchive.org/archive/BOUPOP-3, accessed on: 07.06.2023]
Block, N. “Concepts and Percepts: Reply to Hilary Putnam”, in: A. Pautz, D. Stoljar (eds.). Blockheads!: Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. MIT Press, 2019, pp. 451–458.
Block, N. The Border Between Seeing and Thinking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2023.
Conant, J. “An Introduction to Hilary Putnam”, in: J. Conant, S. Chakraborty (eds.) Engaging Putnam. De Gruyter, 2022, pp. 1–46.
De Caro, M. “Putnam on the Mind-body Problem”, Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 2018, vol. 31, pp. 155–163.
De Gaynesford, M. Hilary Putnam. McGill-Queen’s University Press; First edition, 2006.
Dennett, D.C. I’ve Been Thinking. W.W. Norton & Company, 2023.
Dzhohadze, I.D. Pragmaticheskij realizm Hilari Patnjema [The Pragmatic Realism of Hilary Putnam]. Moscow: Kanon+ ROOI “Reabilitacija” Publ., 2013. (In Russian)
Dzhohadze, I.D. “V zashhitu semanticheskogo jeksternalizma. Argumenty Hilari Patnjema” [In Defence of Semantic Externalism. Hilary Putnam’s Arguments], Philosophy Journal, 2017, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 154–162. (In Russian)
Gusev, A.A. “Problema vosprijatija: dizjunktivizm vs reprezentacionalizm” [The Problem of Perception: Disjunctivism vs Representationalism], The Philosophy Journal, 2022, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 115–130. (In Russian)
Ivanov, D.V. “Jeksternalizm i teorija rasshirennogo soznanija” [Externalism and the Theory of Extended Mind], Philosophy of Science and Technology, 2019, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 33–42. (In Russian)
Lebedev, M.V. “‘The Matrix Never Has You’. Hilary Putnam i tradicionnaja filosofija” [“The Matrix Never Has You”. Hilary Putnam and Traditional Philosophy], in: T. Dmitrieva, M. Lebedeva (trans.), H. Putnam. Razum, istina i istorija [Reason, Truth and History]. Moscow: Praksis Publ., 2002, pp. 283–294. (In Russian)
Makeeva, L.B. Filosofija H. Putnam [The Philosophy of H. Putnam]. Moscow: IF RAN Publ., 1996, 190 p. (In Russian)
Makeeva L.B. “Semanticheskie idei H. Putnam” [Semantic Ideas of H. Putnam], History of Philosophy, 1997, no. 1, pp. 121–135. (In Russian)
Makeeva, L.B. “Predislovie” [Preface], in: H. Putnam. Filosofija soznanija [Philosophy of Mind], trans. by L. Makeeva, O. Nazarova & A. Nikiforov. Moscow: Dom intellektual’noj knigi Publ., 1999, pp. 7–22. (In Russian)
Pitt, D. The Quality of Thought. Oxford University Press, 2024.
Putnam, H. Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Putnam, H. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Putnam, H. Representation and Reality. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
Putnam, H. Words and Life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
Putnam, H. The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Putnam, H. Philosophy in an Age of Science: Physics, Mathematics, and Skepticism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012.
Putnam, H. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.
Valberg, J. The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Vasilyev V.V. Trudnaja problema soznanija [The Hard Problem of Consciousness]. Moscow: Progress-Tradicija Publ., 2009. (In Russian)
Williamson, T. “Can Cognition Be Factorised into Internal and External Components?”, in: R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp. 291–306.
Xu, Y. “The Putnam-McDowell Controversy on Perception and the Relevant Sciences”, Philosophia, 2022, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 787–814.
