THE PROBLEM OF THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20256219Keywords:
epistemic value, knowledge, truth, true belief, reliable, virtuous, justified, instrumental valueAbstract
The problem of the value of knowledge is one of the most discussed in epistemology in recent times. Why should we strive to acquire knowledge, and not just true beliefs or relevant information about the subject of our cognitive interest? It is not hard to show that knowledge has certain instrumental value; but defenders of the idea in question usually mean that knowledge is valuable regardless of its practical consequences. It is not easy to justify this position, though. Some believe that knowledge is a better guide to truth than just true beliefs, or even that knowledge guarantees truth. Others try to identify intrinsic properties of knowledge which can give knowledge additional value due to having their own relevant value. Yet others deny that knowledge has special value that distinguishes it cognitively from true belief, at least universally. Many agree that it can be shown that the possession of knowledge of one kind or another is more valuable than just believing the proposition which is true. But it is much more difficult to show that knowledge is universally more valuable due to some of its own properties, rather than circumstances. But those, who talk about special value of knowledge, normally mean some intrinsic and universal value to be reflected in definition. The article examines several popular explanations of the special epistemic value of knowledge and identifies their shortcomings. The author believes that it is easier for some types of knowledge than for some others to show how knowledge is more valuable than just true belief. The most primitive as well as the most abstract types of knowledge are most often functionally indistinguishable from the corresponding true beliefs. Meanwhile, many types of knowledge have modal functional differences from the corresponding true beliefs, and it is possible to show why they may have additional epistemic value. However, in its universal form, this idea is most likely impossible to defend.
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