THE EPISTEMIC RELEVANCE OF THE EXPERIENCE OF LIBERTARIAN AGENCY
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5840/eps20256218Keywords:
free will, libertarianism, compatibilism, incompatibilism, the principle of credulity, phenomenological argumentAbstract
In this paper, the author offers a phenomenological argument that we are libertarian agents: we can choose between alternative possibilities and are the sources of our actions. The author demonstrates that it is necessary to accept the evidence of experience unless there are sufficient reasons against it because otherwise, it leads to global skepticism. Further, the author considers potential objections to the argument and concludes that at this point, there is not enough evidence to reject the experience that we are libertarian agents. The arguments for and against global determinism balance each other out. The scientific evidence favoring local determinism is insufficient due to flawed research design. In addition, the author demonstrates that the other arguments are against a certain type of free will theories, not against us being libertarian agents. The author concludes that the experience of libertarian agency is crucial at the current moment, but this does not mean that this will always be the case. Beyond this, it remains possible to deny that we have a phenomenological experience of libertarian agency. In addition, the author formulates a theory of free will that is based on the concept of libertarian agency and demonstrates how theories of this type deal with Frankfurt cases.
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