MEANING: REALISM VS SKEPTICISM

Authors

  • Vsevolod A. Ladov Tomsk Scientific Center of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Science, National Research Tomsk State University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202461221

Keywords:

Wittgenstein, Kripke, Borisov, meaning, realism, skepticism, semantics, epistemology

Abstract

A straight solution to Kripke’s problem proposed by Borisov is discussed in the article. The significance of the problem for modern philosophy of language and epistemology is established. Controversial aspects in Borisov’s study are analyzed. The main question is following: what solution to Kripke’s problem would be considered straight? It is argued that Borisov’s solution does not reach the level of a straight solution, although it represents a significant step in this direction. The methodological importance of Borisov’s thesis that knowledge of meaning is not an interpretation of the facts of speech behavior is substantiated.

References

Borisov, E.V. “Pryamoe reshenie problemy Kripke” [A Straight Solution to Kripke’s problem], Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2024, vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 23–32. (In Russian)

Davidson, D. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001.

Frege, G. Logicheskie issledovaniya [Logical Investigations], trans. by V.A. Surovtsev. Tomsk: Vodolej, 1997. (Trans. into Russian)

Goodman, N. Ways of Worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978.

Katz, J. The Metaphysics of Meaning. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990.

Katz, J. Realistic Rationalism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000.

Kripke, S. Vitgenshtein o pravilakh i individual’nom jazyke [Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language], trans. by V.A. Ladov and V.A. Surovtsev. Tomsk: Tomsk University Press, 2005. (Trans. into Russian)

Ladov, V.A. “Reshenie logicheskikh paradoksov v semanticheski zamknutom yazyke” [Logical Paradoxes Solution in Semantically Closed Language], Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2017, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 104–119. (In Russian)

Ladov, V. “Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and a Hierarchical Approach to Solving Logical Paradoxes”, Filosofija. Sociologija, 2019, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 36–43.

Ladov, V.A. Illyuziya znacheniya: Problema sledovaniya pravilu v analiticheskoj filosofii [The Illusion of Meaning: The Rule-Following Problem in Analytic Philosophy]. Moscow: Kanon+, 2023. (In Russian)

Ladov, V.A. “O paradoksakh: otvet opponentam” [On Paradoxes: Reply to Critics], Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2023, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 17–30. (In Russian)

Quine, W.V.O. World and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964.

Diamond, C. (ed.) Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976.

Ambrose, A. (ed.) Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1932–35. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

Published

2024-09-18

How to Cite

[1]
2024. MEANING: REALISM VS SKEPTICISM. Epistemology & Philosophy of Science. 61, 2 (Sep. 2024), 43–50. DOI:https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202461221.