Модальная теория конституирования и онтология личности
Ключевые слова:
метафизика, конституирование, совпадение в пространстве, мереология, тождество личности
Аннотация
Модальная теория конституирования представляет собой одно из самых влиятельных решений парадоксов совпадения и теорий тождества личности. Она опирается на три фундаментальные предпосылки: объекты здравого смысла существуют; иногда объекты совпадают в пространстве; совпадение объектов в пространстве требует объяснения. В статье автор предлагает критику модальной теории конституирования. Рассматривается определение конституирования и предлагается новый аргумент в пользу того, что модальная теория либо не обеспечивает асимметричности конституирования, либо приводит к бесконечной серии конституируемых объектов, неудовлетворительным образом расширяя онтологию. Автор демонстрирует, что возможные дополнения определения конституирования, которые способны сделать определение достаточным для асимметричности отношения, ведут к дополнительным теоретическим затруднениям, приводящим к логической невозможности конституирования. Также автор демонстрирует, что теория конституирования предлагает неудовлетворительную теорию личности, поскольку сталкивается с тремя проблемами: проблемой перенаселения, эпистемической проблемой и проблемой личности.
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Литература
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Simons, P. “Coincidence of Things of a Kind”, Mind, 1985, vol. 94, no. 373, pp. 70–75.
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Snowdon, P.F. “Persons, Animals, and Ourselves”, in: C. Gill (ed.). The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 83–107.
Thomson, J.J. “Parthood and Identity Across Time”, Journal of Philosophy, 1983, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 201–220.
Thomson, J.J. “People and Their Bodies”, in: J. Dancy (ed.). Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 202–229.
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Wiggins, D. “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time”, Philosophical Review, 1968, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 90–95.
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Yablo, S. “Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 1987, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 293–314.
Baker, L.R. “Why Constitution is Not Identity”, Journal of Philosophy,1997, vol. 94, no. 12, pp. 599–621.
Baker, L.R. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 233 pp.
Baker, L.R. “On Making Things Up: Constitution and its Critics”, Philosophical Topics, 2002, vol. 30, no.1, pp. 31–52.
Baker, L.R. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 270 pp.
Benovsky, J. 2018. Eliminativism, Objects, and Persons: The Virtues of Non-Existence. New York: Routledge, 2018, 190 pp.
Brower, J.E., Rea, M.C. “Material Constitution and the Trinity”, Faith and Philosophy, 2005, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 57–76.
Burke, M.B. “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account”, Analysis,1992, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 12–17.
Carter, W.R. “Our Bodies, Our Selves”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1988, vol. 66, no. 3, pp. 308–319.
Chappell, V. “Locke on the Ontology of Matter, Living Things and Persons”, Philosophical Studies, 1990, vol. 60, no. 1–2, pp. 19–32.
Doepke, F.C. The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1996, 288 pp.
Doepke, F.C. “Spatially Coinciding Objects”, Ratio, 1982, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 45-60
Fine, K. “The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its Matter”, Mind, 2003, vol. 112, no. 446, pp. 195–234.
Johnston, M. “Constitution is Not Identity”, Mind, 1992, vol. 101, no. 401, pp. 89–106.
Johnston, M., Forbes, G. “Is There a Problem About Persistence?”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 1987, vol. 61, no. 1, pp.107–156.
Kripke, S.A. “Identity and Necessity”, in: M.K. Munitz (ed.). Identity and Individuation. New York: New York University Press, 1971, pp.135–164.
Levey, S. “Coincidence and Principles of Composition”, Analysis, 1997, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 1–10.
Lowe, E.J. “Instantiation, Identity and Constitution”, Philosophical Studies, 1983, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 45–59.
Lowe, E.J. “Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the “Standard Account.””, Analysis, 1995, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 171–178.
Mawson, T.J. Belief in God: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 2005, 272 pp.
McDowell, J. “Reductionism and the First Person”, in: J. Dancy (ed.). Reading Parfit. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, pp.230–250.
Merricks, T. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 216 рp.
Oderberg, D.S. “Coincidence Under a Sortal”, Philosophical Review, 1996, vol. 105, no. 2, pp.145–171.
Olson, E.T. The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 200 pp.
Olson, E.T. “An Argument for Animalism”, in: R. Martin, J. Barresi (eds.). Personal identity. Blackwell readings in philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, pp. 318-334.
Olson, E.T. What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 264 pp.
Paul, L.A. “The Puzzles of Material Constitution”, Philosophy Compass, 2010, vol. 5, no. 7, pp. 579–590.
Pereboom, D. “On Baker’s Persons and Bodies”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2002, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 615–622.
Pollock, J. Knowledge and Justification. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, 362 pp.
Salmon, N. Reference and Essence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, 433 p.
Shoemaker, S. “Self, Body, and Coincidence”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 1999, vol. 73, no. 1, pp. 287–306.
Shoemaker, S. “Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2003, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 1–23.
Shoemaker, S. “Functionalism and Personal Identity: A Reply”, Noûs, 2004, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 525–533.
Shorter, J.M. “On Coinciding in Space and Time”, Philosophy, 1977, vol. 52, no. 202, pp. 399–408.
Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, 288 pp.
Sider, T. “Review of Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies”, Journal of Philosophy, 2002, vol. 99, no. 1, pp. 45–48.
Simons, P. “Coincidence of Things of a Kind”, Mind, 1985, vol. 94, no. 373, pp. 70–75.
Simons, P. Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, 408 pp.
Snowdon, P.F. “Persons, Animals, and Ourselves”, in: C. Gill (ed.). The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 83–107.
Thomson, J.J. “Parthood and Identity Across Time”, Journal of Philosophy, 1983, vol. 80, no. 4, pp. 201–220.
Thomson, J.J. “People and Their Bodies”, in: J. Dancy (ed.). Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 202–229.
Thomson, J.J. “The Statue and the Clay”, Noûs, 1998, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 149–173.
Wasserman, R. “The Constitution Question”, Noûs, 2004, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 693–710.
Wiggins, D. “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time”, Philosophical Review, 1968, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 90–95.
Wiggins, D. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 276 pp.
Yablo, S. “Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility”, Journal of Philosophy, 1987, vol. 84, no. 6, pp. 293–314.
Опубликован
2023-05-11
Как цитировать
Фауль Б. В. Модальная теория конституирования и онтология личности // Эпистемология и философия науки. 2023. Т. 60. № 1. С. 98-114.
Раздел
Language and Mind
