Критика картезианской концепции знания о себе в англоязычной аналитической философии: обзор основных стратегий
Ключевые слова:
знание о себе, картезианство, аналитическая философия, ментальное состояние, приватность, интроспекция, интернализм, КК-принцип
Аннотация
В статье представлены основные стратегии критики картезианской концепции знания о себе в аналитической англоязычной философии. Выделяются четыре базовых аспекта данной концепции: метафизический (как обосновываются свойства знания о себе), методологический (каким способом приобретается знание о себе), семантический (каков источник содержания ментальных состояний) и логико-эпистемический (каков формальный коррелят знания о себе). Рассматриваются четыре соответствующих выделенным аспектам стратегии их критики: критика метафизического аспекта состоит в отказе от тезиса о приватности ментальных состояний, критика методологического аспекта – в отказе от представления об интроспекции по аналогии с восприятием объектов внешнего мира, критика семантического аспекта – в отказе от интерналистской идеи о том, что содержание ментальных состояний не детерминировано внешними факторами, и, наконец, критика логико-эпистемического аспекта – в отказе от соблюдения КК-принципа. Даётся краткая оценка эффективности данных стратегий критики.
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Литература
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Bilgrami, A. Self-knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, M. A.: Harvard University Press, 2006, 401 pp.
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Brueckner, A. "What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori", Analysis, 1992, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 111–118.
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Burge, T. "Individualism and Self-Knowledge", Journal of Philosophy, 1988, vol. 85, pp. 649–663.
Byrne, A. "Introspection", Philosophical Topics, 2005, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 79–104.
Byrne, A. Transparency and Self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 227 pp.
Carruthers, P. The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 448 pp.
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Dretske, F. "Epistemic operators", The Journal of Philosophy, 1970, vol. 67, no. 24, pp. 1007–1023.
Dretske, F. Naturalizing Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995, 208 pp.
Evans, G. Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, 436 pp.
Fernández, J. Transparent Minds. The Study of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 240 pp.
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Hintikka, J. Knowledge and Belief. An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962, 189 pp.
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Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1982, 160 pp.
McDowell, J. "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space", in: P. Pettit, J. McDowell (eds.) Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 136–168.
McKinsey, M. "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access", Analysis, 1991, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 9–16.
Moran, R. "Making up Your Mind", Ratio, 1988, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 135–151.
Moran, R. Authority and Estrangement. An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, 256 pp.
Myers, G.E. "Introspection and Self-Knowledge", American Philosophical Quarterly, 1986, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 199–207.
Nozick, R. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1981, 752 pp.
Putnam, H. "The Meaning of «Meaning»", in: H. Putnam Philosophical Papers. Vol. II: Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 215–271.
Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Oxford: Routledge, 2009, 377 pp.
Shoemaker, S. "Self-knowledge and «Inner Sense». Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model", in: S. Shoemaker The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 224–245.
Shoemaker, S. "Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief", Erkenntnis, 2009, vol. 71, pp. 35–51.
Srinivasan, A. "Are We Luminous", Philosophy and Phenomenology Research, 2015, vol. 90, no. 2, pp. 294–319.
Stalnaker, R. "Luminosity and the KK-thesis", in: S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 19–40.
Stalnaker, R. "On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility", Mind, 2009, vol. 118, no. 470, pp. 399–409.
Steiner, M. "Cartesian Scepticism and Epistemic Logic", Analysis, 1979, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 38–41.
Tennant, N. "Truth as Knowable", in: N. Tennant The Taming of the True. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 245–281.
Williamson, T. "On the Paradox of Knowability", Mind, 1987, vol. 96, pp. 256–261.
Williamson, T. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 352 pp.
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, trans. by P.M.S. Hacker, J. Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 321 pp.
Wright, C. "Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy", Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 1998, vol. 43, pp. 101–122.
Wright, C. "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention", Journal of Philosophy, 1989, vol. 86, no. 11, pp. 622–634.
Yli-Vakkuri, J. "Semantic externalism without thought experiments", Analysis, 2017, vol. 78, no. 1, pp. 81–89.
Bailey, G.W.S. Privacy and the Mental. Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1979, 175 pp.
Bar-On, D. Speaking My mind. Expression and Self-knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, 449 p.
Berker, S. "Luminosity Regained", Philosophers' Imprint, 2008, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 1–22.
Bilgrami, A. Self-knowledge and Resentment. Cambridge, M. A.: Harvard University Press, 2006, 401 pp.
Boghossian, P. "What the Externalist Can Know A Priori", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1997, vol. 97, pp. 161–175.
Brueckner, A. "What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori", Analysis, 1992, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 111–118.
Brueckner, A., Fiocco, M.O. "Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument", Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 2002, vol. 110, no. 3, pp. 285–293.
Burge, T. "Cartesian error and the objectivity of perception", in: P. Pettit, J. McDowell (eds.) Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 117–136.
Burge, T. "Postscript to «Individualism and the Mental", in: T. Burge Foundations of Mind (Philosophical Essays. Vol. 2). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 151–181.
Burge, T. "Individualism and Self-Knowledge", Journal of Philosophy, 1988, vol. 85, pp. 649–663.
Byrne, A. "Introspection", Philosophical Topics, 2005, vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 79–104.
Byrne, A. Transparency and Self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 227 pp.
Carruthers, P. The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 448 pp.
Cassam, Q. "The Basis of Self-Knowledge", Erkenntnis, 2009, vol. 71, no. 1, pp. 3–18.
Cassam, Q. Self-Knowledge for Humans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 238 pp.
Colliva, A. The Varieties of Self-Knowledge. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 304 pp.
Davidson, D. "First Person Authority", Dialectica, 1984, vol. 38, no. 2/3, pp. 101–111.
Davidson, D. "Knowing One’s Own Mind", Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1987, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 441–458.
Davidson, D. "What is Present to Mind?", Philosophical Issues, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 197–213.
Dennett, D. "Why Everyone is a Novelist", The Times Literary Supplement, 1998, vol. 16–22, no. 4, pp. 1016, 1028–1029.
Dennett, D. Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998, 400 pp.
Dretske, F. "Epistemic operators", The Journal of Philosophy, 1970, vol. 67, no. 24, pp. 1007–1023.
Dretske, F. Naturalizing Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995, 208 pp.
Evans, G. Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, 436 pp.
Fernández, J. Transparent Minds. The Study of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 240 pp.
Finkelstein, D. "From Transparency to Expressivism", in: G. Abel, J. Conant (eds.) Rethinking Epistemology. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2012, pp. 101–118.
Finkelstein, D. Expression and the Inner. Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2003, 194 pp.
Fitch, F. "A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts", Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1963, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 135–142.
Fricker, E. "Self-Knowledge: Special Access Versus Artefact of Grammar – A Dichotomy Rejected", in: C. Macdonald, B. Smith, C. Wright (eds.) Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 155–206.
Gertler, B. "Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief", in: A. Hatzimoysis (ed.) Self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 125–145.
Goldman, A. I. "Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge", Journal of Philosophy, 1976, vol. 73, no. 20, pp. 771–791.
Green, M.S. Self-Expression. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 240 pp.
Hawthorne, J. "A Priority and Externalism", in: S. Goldberg (ed.) Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007, pp. 201–218.
Hawthorne, J., Yli-Vakkuri, J. Narrow Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 213 pp.
Hintikka, J. Knowledge and Belief. An introduction to the logic of the two notions. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962, 189 pp.
Immerman, 2020 – Immerman, D. "Williamson, Closure, and KK", Synthese, 2020, vol. 197, no. 8, pp. 3349–3373.
Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1982, 160 pp.
McDowell, J. "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space", in: P. Pettit, J. McDowell (eds.) Subject, Thought, and Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 136–168.
McKinsey, M. "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access", Analysis, 1991, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 9–16.
Moran, R. "Making up Your Mind", Ratio, 1988, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 135–151.
Moran, R. Authority and Estrangement. An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, 256 pp.
Myers, G.E. "Introspection and Self-Knowledge", American Philosophical Quarterly, 1986, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 199–207.
Nozick, R. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1981, 752 pp.
Putnam, H. "The Meaning of «Meaning»", in: H. Putnam Philosophical Papers. Vol. II: Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 215–271.
Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind. Oxford: Routledge, 2009, 377 pp.
Shoemaker, S. "Self-knowledge and «Inner Sense». Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model", in: S. Shoemaker The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 224–245.
Shoemaker, S. "Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief", Erkenntnis, 2009, vol. 71, pp. 35–51.
Srinivasan, A. "Are We Luminous", Philosophy and Phenomenology Research, 2015, vol. 90, no. 2, pp. 294–319.
Stalnaker, R. "Luminosity and the KK-thesis", in: S. Goldberg (ed.) Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 19–40.
Stalnaker, R. "On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility", Mind, 2009, vol. 118, no. 470, pp. 399–409.
Steiner, M. "Cartesian Scepticism and Epistemic Logic", Analysis, 1979, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 38–41.
Tennant, N. "Truth as Knowable", in: N. Tennant The Taming of the True. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 245–281.
Williamson, T. "On the Paradox of Knowability", Mind, 1987, vol. 96, pp. 256–261.
Williamson, T. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 352 pp.
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, trans. by P.M.S. Hacker, J. Schulte. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 321 pp.
Wright, C. "Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy", Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 1998, vol. 43, pp. 101–122.
Wright, C. "Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention", Journal of Philosophy, 1989, vol. 86, no. 11, pp. 622–634.
Yli-Vakkuri, J. "Semantic externalism without thought experiments", Analysis, 2017, vol. 78, no. 1, pp. 81–89.
Опубликован
2022-09-01
Как цитировать
Ольга Александровна К. Критика картезианской концепции знания о себе в англоязычной аналитической философии: обзор основных стратегий // Эпистемология и философия науки. 2022. Т. 59. № 1. С. 94-116.
Раздел
Language and Mind
