ОТВЕТ ОППОНЕНТАМ ПО ПОВОДУ ФИЛОСОФСКОЙ МЕТОДОЛОГИИ
Ключевые слова:
кабинетная философия, интуиции, априорное знание, абдукция, построение моделей
Аннотация
В данной статье автор отвечает на критические замечания оппонентов (Д. Деннета, Дж. Ноуба, А.В. Кузнецова и Д. Столжара).
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Литература
Dennett, D. "Philosophy or Auto-Anthropology?", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 26-28.
Knobe, J. "Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 29-36.
Kuznetsov, A. "Armchair Science And Armchair Philosophy", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 43-45.
Nagel, J. "Intuitions And Experiments: A Defense Of The Case Method In Epistemology", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012, vol. 85, pp. 495-527.
Stoljar, D. "Williamson On Laws And Progress In Philosophy", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 37-42.
Williamson, T. "Philosophical Intuitions and Scepticism About Judgment’, Dialectica, 2004, vol. 58, pp. 109-153.
Williamson, T. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007, 346 pp.
Williamson, T. ‘How Deep Is The Distinction Between A Priori And A Posteriori Knowledge?’, in: A. Casullo & J. Thurow (eds.). The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 291-312.
Williamson, T. Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 176 pp.
Williamson, T. "Armchair Philosophy", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 19-25.
Knobe, J. "Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Robust Across Demographic Differences", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 29-36.
Kuznetsov, A. "Armchair Science And Armchair Philosophy", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 43-45.
Nagel, J. "Intuitions And Experiments: A Defense Of The Case Method In Epistemology", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2012, vol. 85, pp. 495-527.
Stoljar, D. "Williamson On Laws And Progress In Philosophy", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 37-42.
Williamson, T. "Philosophical Intuitions and Scepticism About Judgment’, Dialectica, 2004, vol. 58, pp. 109-153.
Williamson, T. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2007, 346 pp.
Williamson, T. ‘How Deep Is The Distinction Between A Priori And A Posteriori Knowledge?’, in: A. Casullo & J. Thurow (eds.). The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 291-312.
Williamson, T. Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 176 pp.
Williamson, T. "Armchair Philosophy", Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 19-25.
Опубликован
2019-09-09
Как цитировать
Уильямсон Т. ОТВЕТ ОППОНЕНТАМ ПО ПОВОДУ ФИЛОСОФСКОЙ МЕТОДОЛОГИИ // Эпистемология и философия науки. 2019. Т. 56. № 2. С. 46-52.
Раздел
Panel Discussion
